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MODULATING GRAMMAR THROUGH MODALITY: A 
DISCOURSE APPROACH* 
Francisco Gonzálvez García 
Universidad de Almería  
This paper argues for a dynamic, discourse-based approach to modality 
which departs from the traditional, monolithic account of modality in a 
number of interesting respects: (i) modality is characterized as conveying the 
speaker’s involvement in the propositional content of a given utterance 
(either in the form of agency or subjectivity)  (ii) modality can be said to 
ramify across the whole lexico-grammatical architecture of the language, 
(iii) many of the meanings usually ascribed to individual modal verbs are in 
fact derived either from the verb’s sentential environment or from some 
wider context of utterance, and (iv) modal meaning in discourse can be said 
to arise out of the interaction of two closely connected layers of meaning: 
one embracing the inherent linguistic meaning of the modal verb in 
conjunction with that of other neighbouring modal devices, and another 
concerned with principles connected with politeness and face-saving 
strategies. 
1. Introduction 
Modality in English and other languages has been the focus of 
attention of scholars from distinct disciplines and approaches over the last 
thirty years. Within linguistics, the study of modality has witnessed a gradual 
shift from a monolithic, static conception to a more dynamic understanding 
of modality taking into account the relevance of linguistic and extralinguistic 
contextual factors in the production and interpretation of modal utterances in 
discourse (Bybee & Fleischman 1995) or the creation of modal textual 
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coherence (Lundquist 1989). This paper seeks to shed some light on a 
number of conspicuous issues within this relatively new discourse-oriented 
program of research into modality, which can be briefly summarized as in 
(1)-(5) below:  
 
(1) How can modality be aptly and comprehensively defined on both 
semantic and pragmatic grounds? 
(2) What linguistic devices can be considered carriers of modal meaning? 
(3) What are the means whereby each modal device modulates the speaker’s 
involvement which is interpreted from the utterance of that sentence in 
context? 
(4) How can the modal meaning in general and its dynamic relation to the 
context of utterance in particular, be adequately accounted for from a 
theoretical and descriptive standpoint? 
(5) How can we characterize the enriching (reinforcing or cumulative) effect 
of contextual factors in the unfolding of “modal” meaning/s in a given piece 
of discourse? 
2. The definition and scope of modality: a question of “attitude” 
The extensive bulk of literature on modality shows a clear tendency 
among linguists1 to accept that semantic areas such as possibility, necessity 
and prediction (knowledge or epistemic “modality”), on the one hand, and 
“permission”, “obligation” and “volition” (“deontic” or “root” modality), on 
the other, constitute the domains of modality. A non-concomitant view with 
the mainstream conception of modality was already advanced by Halliday 
(1970:349) in the following terms: “Modality....is the speaker’s assessment of 
probability and predictability. It is external to the content, being part of the 
                                                     
1 See, for instance, Lyons (1977, 1983, 1994), Hermerén (1978), Coates (1983), Perkins 
(1983) and Palmer (1986, 1990), among others. 
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attitude taken up by the speaker”.2  This “reductionist” view of modality will 
not be invoked in this paper, since it obscures the fact that deontic modality 
can nevertheless be regarded as “a form of participation of the speaker in the 
speech event” (Halliday 1970:335) and plays a significant role in the 
interpersonal process of negotiation of meaning.3 Instead, the following 
definition will be adopted, along the lines suggested by Lyons 
(1977,1983,1994),  where the term “attitude” has been expanded into that of 
“subjectivity”4 understood as “subject/speaker’s involvement” so as to 
embrace both types of modality: 
Subjectivity is a matter of speaker’s, or more generally, of the locutionary 
agent’s involvement of himself in the utterance. In the case of epistemic 
modality what is involved is his knowledge (or beliefs). In the case of 
deontic modality it is his will and authority that is involved. But in both 
cases it is the locutionary agent who is the source of the modality (Lyons 
                                                     
2 Therefore, modality in systemic grammar is restricted to what is called “epistemic” modality, 
and what is often referred to as “root” or “deontic” modality is regarded as forming a different 
(though obviously connected) category of its own, namely, “modulation”, the reason being 
that the latter “...are not speaker’s comments on the process referred to...” (Halliday 
1970:338). 
3 In this respect, two more specific criticisms can be levelled against Halliday’s restrictive 
formulation of modality: (i) the fact that a clear-cut distinction between both types of modality 
can be challenged at an ideational level, since cases of indeterminacy (“merger”) may occur 
(Leech & Coates:1980, Coates:1983, Bald 1990:354, among others); and (ii) both epistemic 
and deontic modality may be geared towards the interpersonal component of the language (i.e. 
politeness strategies in general and face-saving in particular). We shall have more to say about 
this at a later stage in this paper. 
4 Palmer (1986:16) also argues that subjectivity is an essential criterion for modality, which he 
defines as “the grammaticalization of speaker’s (subjective) attitude and opinions.” In our 
definition of modality, we shall leave out the “grammaticalization” component as it belongs to 
the domains of mood rather than modality. 
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1983:111).5  
 
 Therefore, it can be claimed that modality is concerned with the 
expression of the subject/speaker’s involvement towards the propositional 
content of an utterance, whether in the form of agency or subjectivity.6 An 
interesting conclusion ensuing from the above definition is that modality 
need not, and should by no means, be exclusively restricted to modal 
auxiliary (or semi-auxiliary) verbs. 
 
  Over the last fifteen years, linguists have concentrated on surveying a 
more or less comprehensive inventory of modal elements,7 a representative 
sampling of which can be said to include (i) adjectives (e.g. “possible”, 
“necessary”, etc.), (ii) participles (e.g.“alleged”, “demanded”, etc.), (iii) 
                                                     
5 Hoye (1997:43) argues that “there are problems, however, with subjectivity when it comes to 
an analysis of deontic modality, for here there are varying degrees of speaker involvement”. 
Even when the modality is clearly subject-oriented, the nonfactual status of the utterance can 
be questioned, as in: “John can sing in Romanian”). In much the same vein, Hübler (1983) 
explicitly rejects that semantic notions such as “ability”, “volition” or “futurity” should be 
treated as involving modality.  
This is why linguists like Palmer (1986:102ff, 1990:35ff) have posited a third type of modality 
known as “dynamic modality”. Unlike epistemic and deontic modality, dynamic modality is 
not subjective and is subject- rather than speaker-oriented: the subject’s ability or willingness 
is at issue, not the speaker’s attitudes or opinions. This three-fold distinction will be retained in 
this paper. 
6 The term “speaker” should be understood here as a general semantico-pragmatic function, in 
other words, as the subject of modality, “...the one who invests in the Subject as the modally 
responsible element in the clause and in relation to whom the Finiteness of the proposition is 
organized” (Thibault 1995:64). 
7 See, for further reference, Bailey (1981), Perkins (1983) and Hermerén (1986), among 
others. 
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nouns (e.g. “necessity”, “consideration”, etc.),8 (iv) lexical verbs (e.g. 
“wonder”, “order”, etc.), (v) adverbs (e.g. “perhaps”, “obviously”, etc.), (vi) 
articles (e.g. “the”/ “a”, “some”/ “any”, etc.),9 (vii) tense (usually in 
“preterite” or marked forms) (e.g. “I thought you in Paris”, “In 1492, 
Columbus discovers America”),10 (viii) aspect (marked forms) (e.g. “John is 
having a headache”),11 (ix) particles (e.g. “if”) and truth-functionally 
equivalent devices (e.g. subject-verb inversion, putative “should”) (e.g. “If 
you don’t like it 12/ should you not like it, that’s your hard luck”), (x) the 
degree of morphosyntactic compression in the encoding of a sentential 
complement (finite, non-finite or verbless clause) (e.g. “They consider that 
                                                     
8 Jacobson’s (1982) study on modal nouns shows, among other things, that there is a much 
greater variety of lexical items in the field of modality nouns than in that of modal auxiliaries. 
This finding points to one of the many inconveniences of treating modal verbs as the exclusive 
or main carrier of modal meaning. 
9 Lyons (1983) provides an interesting outline of the many connections between 
“demonstrative” and “indicative” and Rauch (1983) also further explores the relationship 
between modality and deixis in general. Further research will have to address how concepts 
such as anaphora, generality, individuality (and their grammatical correlates such as 
“number”) relate to modality.  
10 Lyons (1983:104) justifies the modal treatment of this marked form (ie. historic present) on 
the grounds that “it conveys an impression of vividness and subjective involvement”. Kress 
(1977), Hutchinson (1985:1), Fleischman (1989:7) and Kvacanovic (1994:67ff), however, 
contend that all tense forms imply a given degree of  speaker’s distance from and attitude 
towards a given proposition and can therefore be seen as modalized forms.   
11 Lyons (1983:101) argues that a dynamic, agentive reading of this sentence is feasible given 
an adequate supporting context (eg., “John is simulating a headache or doing something to 
bring it on). It must be borne in mind that, for Lyons, agency is superimposed upon the notion 
of subjectivity. The exact relationship between subjectivity-agency as the main axes of 
modality remains to be further explored from a linguistic as well as a socio-semiotic 
viewpoint. 
12 Perkins (1983:110) lumps together all types of “if”-clauses (nominal and adverbial) as 
modal.Under the view of modality taken here, contextually motivated variants such as indirect 
speech placed in the past are treated as non-modal. See also Hübler (1983:134) for a position 
along the same lines. 
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John is intelligent/John to be intelligent/John intelligent”, etc.),13 (xi) 
hedging expressions (e.g. “She is a great scholar, I think”), (xii) “emphatic” 
do (e.g. “Do be getting sleepy!”), (xiii) “get”-passives (e.g. “He got elected 
Class President”),14 (xiv) question tags (e.g. “You liked the movie, didn’t 
you?”), (xv) “yes”/ “no” questions (e.g. “Have you ever been to 
London?”),15 (xvi) (rising) intonation (e.g. “I feel happy”),16 and so forth.  
 
The above inventory, by no means complete, is intended to illustrate 
how varied and sophisticated the modality system in English is, thus fully 
endorsing Halliday’s (1970:331) statement that “...there is (thus) no single 
place in the clause where modality is located”. However, the linguistic 
system of modal resources is further enriched by their numberless 
combinatory possibilities in a given piece of discourse. In the words of 
Halliday (1970:331):  
Nor do the different non-verbal forms of the same lexical item necessarily 
correspond with each other: “obviously” is not the same as “it is obvious 
that...”, “surely” as “I am sure that”. But there are discernible groupings, and 
                                                     
13 See Ransom (1977) and Gonzálvez (1997) for an account of the embedded complements as 
having modal meaning. Differences exist as to where the locus of the modal meaning should 
be established. Thus, while for Ransom (1977) the embedded complements have a modal 
meaning of their own and independent of that of their embedding predicates, Gonzálvez 
(1997) proposes that the modal meaning arises out of a complex, dynamic interaction of the 
meaning and form properties of the morphosyntactic encoding of the embedded clause with 
those of the embedding predicate.  
14 Bailey (1981:168), quoting Bolinger (p.c.) and Granville Hatcher (1949), argues that “get”-
passives are characterized, among other things, by having more saliently affected subjects than 
their “be”-counterparts, which motivates their being treated as subjectively modalized. 
15 Together with questions, markers of negation are likely candidates for a modal treatment. 
See Palmer (1979) for further discussion on the issue of the relationship between “non-
assertion” and modality,. 
16 See, for further reference, Stevenson (1967), Crystal (1969, 1975), and Roach (1991:164ff), 
among others. The latter is particularly insightful for a better and comprehensive 
understanding of the attitudinal function of intonation in general. 
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a clear distinction can be drawn between pairs which are felt to be 
equivalent, and thus reinforce each other (“as concord”) when both are 
present, as in “Perhaps he might have built it”, and those which are not 
equivalent and are thus cumulative in meaning, as in “Certainly he might 
have built it” (“I insist that it is possible” or “I grant that it is possible”).17 
An interesting conclusion ensuing from the above is that modal 
meaning can be said to resolve itself into a more or less intricate flow of 
reinforcing or cumulative modal devices which invades the whole lexico-
grammatical architecture of the language, always subject to the 
communicative requirements of the interlocutors in the modalised space-time 
if dialogic negotiation.18 
3. Towards a “dynamic”, context-based view of modal meaning 
Traditional (and not so traditional) accounts of modality present in 
our view two important shortcomings when tackling the issue of modal 
meaning: (i) they fail to separate the intrinsic linguistic meaning of modal 
verbs from the linguistic meaning of other neighbouring modal items (of 
different kinds) in the sentential environment in which they are inserted, and 
(ii) they also fail to distinguish the meaning of modal verbs from the 
(endless) number of pragmatic uses or functions these may be put to in 
specific contexts.  
 
                                                     
17 See Lyons (1977:Chapter 17) for a similar position in the form of a distinction between 
modally harmonic and non-harmonic meaning. 
18 In addition, it must be borne in mind that modality may be implicated by the semantic 
structure of the whole utterance without being signalled by any specific (linguistic) markers. 
Thus, Costa (1975:119-21) (quoted in Brown & Levinson (1978:274), notes that English 
statements like “One just doesn’t do things like that” can implicate the deontic modality 
interpretation (“You must not do things like that”). In our view, the discourse approach to 
modality invoked in this paper can prove useful to help to determine to what extent covert 
modality may be implicated with the aid of neighbouring (linguistic) devices in a given 
discourse scenario. 
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The consequences to be derived from this cannot possibly be 
expected to be advantageous from either a theoretical or descriptive view. 
Thus, as Walton (1991:367) rightly argues, “...the meanings that are ascribed 
to modal verbs multiply arbitrarily as more and more context is added, and 
any reference grammar aimed at recording these meanings will come to 
resemble a lexicon and still fail to cover them all”. 
 
Let us briefly illustrate the relevance of the above statement with 
particular relevance to the taxonomy of modal meanings for “might” in three 
well-known works on modality: Leech (1971), Coates (1983) and Hoye 
(1997).19 Of the three, the taxonomy proposed by Hoye (1997) is the one 
coming closer to the line of research into modality invoked here, since it 
refrains from attributing the meaning of items in the sentential environment 
of a sentence (i.e. a hypothetical conditional clause, a concessive clause, etc.) 
to the modal verb itself (“hypothetical might”, “concessive might”), or even 
lumping together the inherent meaning of the modal with some of the 
specific pragmatic functions this verb may fulfil in an also specific context of 
                                                     
19 Leech (1971) comes up with something like six different meanings for “might”, namely, (i) 
past tense of “may”, (ii) a “subjunctive substitute” (in clauses of purpose and concession), (iii) 
hypothetical past tense, (iv) “polite permission”, (v) possibility and, (vi) “tentative 
suggestion”. Coates (1983:147-8) makes them eight: (i) epistemic possibility, (ii) past of 
“may” (“epistemic possibility”), (iii) past of “may” (“root possibility”), (iv) past of “may” 
(“root permission”), (v) remote of “may” (“epistemic possibility”), (vi) remote of “may” (root 
possibility) and (vii) remote of “may” (“root permission”). Finally, Hoye (1997:274-5) reduces 
them to three only: (i) epistemic probability/possibility, (ii) non-epistemic (a blending of 
possibility and permission) and (iii) collocational combinations with “well” “to convey 
epistemic probability”, with “just” in “...formulaic expressions of politeness (usually to ask for 
permission)” and, finally, with “(just) as well” to “make a circumspect or sardonic 
recommendation” (Hoye 1997:275). 
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utterance (e.g. “polite permission/suggestion”, etc.).20 
 
  The question now arises as to how modal meaning can be felicitously 
systematized in order to account for the dynamic, though nevertheless 
systematic, relationship between modality, the context of utterance and the 
interpersonal function of politeness.21 Following Silva Corvalán (1995:73ff), 
we shall argue for a monosemantic approach to the semantics and pragmatics 
of modality drawing on intersecting, polysemantic contexts. More 
specifically, it will be suggested that modal meaning can be shaped and 
further modulated in terms of (at least) two separate, though closely 
connected, layers of meaning:22 
 
LAYER 1: (i) SYSTEMATIC MEANING (ie., the meaning present in all 
uses of a modal) in conjunction with (ii) CONTEXTUAL (LINGUISTIC) 
MEANING (i.e. the reinforcing or cumulative modal nuances introduced by 
other satellite elements in the neighbouring sentential (or discourse) 
environment.    
 
LAYER 2: PRAGMATIC (OR INTERPERSONAL) MEANING (i.e. the 
modulation or fine-tuning on the part of interlocutors of the meaning 
                                                     
20 However, in our opinion, Hoye’s account is not without problems either, since it fails to 
account for the relationship between the possibility and permission readings of “might”, on the 
one hand, and the (metalinguistic) function of politeness, on the other, in a neat, systematic 
way. More specifically, Hoye’s account misses the important fact that the politeness factor is 
not a mere appendix of modality, which can be traced in specific formulaic expressions with 
some collocations, but it should rather be seen as an overarching pragmalinguistic function 
that can be overtly or covertly marked in deontic,  epistemic and dyanmic modal utterances, 
rather than just in the former alone, as Hoye’s taxonomy seems to imply. 
21 Politeness is used henceforth in a sense compatible with that of Brown & Levinson (1978), 
though it is taken to encompass not only linguistic but also those socio-semiotic aspects of 
communication. 
22 The following schema departs from the original presented in Silva Corvalán (1995) in that it 
replaces the prototypical discourse meaning component with what has been referred to above 
as pragmatic (or “interpersonal”) meaning. 
F. Gonzálvez García 
 128 
potential arising out of LAYER 1 basically, though not exclusively, in terms of 
other non-linguistic features of the context of utterance, with special focus on 
politeness in general and face-saving in particular).23 
 
The above schema captures, in our opinion, the relationship between 
the locutionary resources of modality, on the one hand, and the interpersonal 
function it can perform in the process of negotiation in a dynamic, 
comprehensive way, on the other, without falling into some of the 
inconsistencies already discussed. 
 
To round off the discussion being entertained in this paper, we shall 
proceed to illustrate succinctly the importance of the dynamic, discourse-
based view of modality invoked in the preceding pages, with specific 
reference to some cursory examples feauturing “might” from the British 
component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB henceforth) and 
an extract from the filmscript of “Four Weddings and a Funeral”, reproduced 
in (6)-(10) below: 
  
(6) “Maybe I might miss something out because we are all human and I’ve 
overlooked it and you’ve remembered it” (ICE-GB Corpus, S2A-061-36). 
 
Here the linguistic meaning of the modal appears to be that of “remote 
                                                     
23 Contextual features also embrace the field of discourse, the mode of discourse, and the style 
of discourse and should eventually be extended to embrace the social dynamics of negotiation 
as a whole. A justification is in order here as to why politeness is given special relevance in 
comparison to other factors such as formality. As Oka (1981:85) has persuasively 
demonstrated, the dominant factors affecting formality are external variables such as relative 
status and intimacy, while politeness is more of a psychological state of a speaker towards his 
addressee. The consideration of contextual factors suggests that formality is more directly 
dependent upon socio-situational factors of language use, whereas politeness is more 
dependent upon the speaker’s attitudinal factors within a particular social setting. It is this 
proximity with speaker’s attitutinal factors that justifies why politeness is seen here as forming 
part of modal meaning. As for the specific relevance of face-saving within politeness, see 
Fraser (1990). 
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possibility”, this being at first sight reinforced by the epistemic modal adverb 
“maybe”. However, as the message progressively unfolds, one finds that the 
modal meaning is made to contrast sharply with some non-modal forms (e.g. 
“are”, “have overlooked” and “have remembered”), thus providing insightful 
clues as to the intended “factual”-like contextual interpretation of the modal 
in question by the speaker-addressee.24 As for the second layer of meaning, 
one can easily see that the choice of the remote form here is motivated by 
face-saving factors, or more exactly, the speaker’s plea of sympathy from the 
audience for any mistake or inaccuracy on his/her part. The point to 
emphasize, however, is that the choice of the form “might miss out”, unlike 
any other feasible choice (e.g. “may have missed”, “might have missed” or 
even the non-modal expression “have missed”) allows the speaker to 
modulate successfully what is highly likely to be an actual mistake in terms 
of an eventual (possible) mistake (epistemic modality), while justifying 
his/her “wrong” course of action in terms of a general weakness of mankind 
(deontic modality). 
 
(7) “I might go back to Cambridge early or something because I’ ve got to write an 
extended essay” (ICE-GB Corpus, S1A-093-26). 
 
As in (6), the use of “might” here could be taken to imply that the 
possibility of the speaker going back to Cambridge is somewhat remote. 
However,  the neighbouring linguistic environment provides unambiguously 
“factual” contextual cues which show that the speaker has already made up 
his mind to go to Cambridge early (e.g. hedging in “or something”, use of a 
modal phrase implying strong obligation in conjunction with the reinforcing 
nuance implicated by “extended”). However, the choice of “might” serves 
the speaker to reveal his intention of leaving early (dynamic modality) 
without precluding any change of plans (knowledge modality). As for the 
                                                     
24 Needless to say, inference strategies are based on the total context of an utterance, which 
includes not only the socio-physical aspect of an utterance, but also encompasses the mutually 
shared knowledge between the speaker and the addressee. 
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interpersonal level of meaning, the high degree of distance of “might” serves 
the speaker to be conventionally indirect and tactful in communicating the 
addressee his real intentions. 
 
(8) “(...) Yes, please, don’t bother for a moment because merely I wanted to know 
whether you disagree, as I think you might do from what you’ve been saying with 
the passage that I’ve quoted from Dr. Kendall’s evidence (...)” (ICE-GB Corpus, 
S2A-061-36). 
  
In (8) above, the use of “might”, far from signalling remote 
possibility, mainly reveals the speaker as adhering to the conventions of 
politeness in an attempt to beg hearer’s forgiveness for a given transgression 
in the communicative exchange. In fact, the unambiguously factual 
evidentiality background on which the speaker’s judgement is based (i.e. 
“you’ve been saying”, “I’ve quoted”) shows that the speaker  is quite sure 
that the hearer disagrees (epistemic modality) and also that it is the hearer’s 
will to show his/her disagreement (dynamic modality). However, through the 
use of “might” (skilfully pre-faced by the hedging expression “I think”), the 
speaker manages to minimize the categoricalness of his/her assertion, thus 
saving face.   
   
(9) “You might wish to do this because, while you have it: any Class 1 contribution 
you pay at a reduced rate do not count for benefit; and you cannot get Home 
Responsibilities Protection; and you are not allowed to pay voluntary 
contributions, and if you are a married woman, you cannot get credits, and from 
October 1989 you could pay more in contribution than colleagues with the same 
earnings but paying standard rate contributions” (ICE-GB Corpus, W2D-004-70) 
 
Example (9) above, taken from a governmental leaflet on tax 
payment, provides clear evidence of how the putative surface interpretation 
of “might” as conveying remote possibility (epistemic modality) or a 
tentative suggestion (deontic modality) is progressively re-shaped through a 
modally consistent network with an overwhelmingly factual, categorical tone 
(e.g. “do not count”, “are not allowed”, “cannot get”). Therefore, the 
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tentative modal stance encoded in “might wish” becomes more forceful as 
the text progresses, to end up implying a relatively high degree of possibility 
(e.g. “You will want to do this”)(epistemic modality) and a forceful 
recommendation (e.g. “You should do this”)(deontic modality). However, the 
choice of “might” enables the speaker to mitigate the underlying forceful 
statement in accordance with politeness strategies in general and the safety 
claim technique of the discourse of advertising in particular.25  
 
(10) Charles: “Tom, can you stop the car?” 
Charles: “Sorry, I think I might stay in the pub after all” 
Tom: “Why on earth?” 
Charles: “Ahm...” 
Charles: “No, seriously, I’ m doing some research into pubs with the name 
“Boat” in the title. I hope to produce the definitive work” (Four Weddings and a 
Funeral, Filmscript) 
 
Example (10) above is perhaps more interesting as it furnishes us 
with a sample of dialogic interaction. Here we know for sure that Charles 
wants to stay in the pub to meet Carrie, the girl of his dreams. Hence the need 
to apologize for a sudden change of plans which might be face-threatening. 
The modal theme initially brought in by “might” (skilfully pre-faced by the 
apology marker “sorry”) ramifies across an intricate constellation of modal 
devices (i.e. the italicized elements above) which help him make it clear to 
Tom that he is definitely staying at the pub (epistemic modality) and 
minimize the imposition of his will upon that of his friends (dynamic 
modality).  
 
In the previous pages, we hope to have shown some of the main 
attractions of a discourse-based approach to modality with a view to gaining 
a more comprehensive (and possibly better) understanding of its relevance 
                                                     
25  The relationship between politeness and interpersonal meaning, on the one hand, and the 
specific discourse type in which the interlocutors are engaged still remains to be further 
explored in future research, as already noted by Brown & Levinson (1978:41), among others. 
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for the encoding and interpretation of modal utterances in the dialogic 
process of negotiation.  
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